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What’s a rational self-torturer to do? 
 
DOUGLAS W. PORTMORE 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper concerns Warren Quinn’s “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.” For the sake of 
argument, I accept Quinn’s assumption that what the self-torturer ought to do is purely a function 
of how the relevant options compare in terms of satisfying his actual preferences. But I argue that, 
even so, we can explain why, in certain instances, advancing is not what the self-torturer ought to 
do without having to claim that, in those instances, his advancing would be no beRer than his not 
advancing in terms of satisfying his actual preferences. For we can admit that his advancing is, in 
every instance, beRer than his not advancing in terms of satisfying his actual preferences but argue 
that, in certain instances, advancing fails to meet some other necessary condition for being what he 
ought to do. One such necessary condition is that it be a genuine option for him. Another is that it 
be something that he can do without responding inappropriately to his reasons—or so I’ll argue. I 
believe, then, that the solution to the puzzle lies in realizing that, in certain instances, advancing is 
something that the self-torturer can do only by responding inappropriately to his reasons.   
 
Someone could prefer A to Z even though she prefers B to A, C to B, D to C, …, and Z to Y. That 
is, her preferences could be as depicted in Figure ,, where ‘φ > ψ’ stands for ‘she prefers φ to ψ’. 
Such preferences are cyclical and, consequently, intransitive. And even though standard 
decision theory considers them to be irrational, they turn out to 
be quite common. Take, for instance, the person who plans to 
quit smoking. For each possible one-last-cigareRe that she could 
smoke, she prefers quiRing after smoking it to quiRing before 
smoking it, and, yet, she prefers quiRing smoking before having 
any more cigareRes to never quiRing. Or take the person who 
needs to go on a diet. For each possible one-last-bite of non-diet food, she prefers going on her 
diet after having that bite to going on her diet before having that bite, and, yet, she prefers 
going on her diet without having any more bites of non-diet food to never going on her diet. 
And it’s not just self-interested preferences that can be cyclical. Moral preferences can be as 
well. Take, for instance, the government authority who is deciding how many citizens to order 
to reduce their carbon emissions. For every positive number n that’s less than the total number 
of citizens, the authority prefers the world in which she orders only n citizens to reduce their 
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carbon emissions to the world in which she orders n+, citizens to reduce their carbon emissions. 
And, yet, she prefers the world in which she orders all citizens to reduce their carbon emissions 
to the world in which she orders none of them to do so.  
So, what should an agent with cyclical preferences do? To ﬁgure this out, it would 
helpful to consider an example that abstracts away from any irrelevant real-world 
complications. Fortunately, Warren Quinn (,--0) has constructed such an example.  
 
There is a medical device that enables doctors to apply electric current to the body in increments so tiny 
that the patient cannot feel them. The device has ,00, seRings: 0 (oﬀ) and ,…,000. Suppose someone (call 
him the self-torturer) agrees to have the device, in some conveniently portable form, aRached to him in 
return for the following conditions: The device is initially set at 0. At the start of each week he is allowed a 
period of free experimentation in which he may try out and compare diﬀerent seRings, after which the 
dial is returned to its previous position. At any other time, he has only two options—to stay put or to 
advance the dial one seRing. But he may advance only one step each week, and he may never retreat. At 
each advance he gets $/0,000. Since the self-torturer cannot feel any diﬀerence in comfort between adjacent 
seRings, he appears to have a clear and repeatable reason to increase the voltage each week. The trouble is 
that there are noticeable diﬀerences in comfort between seRings that are suﬃciently far apart. 
[Consequently,] …the self-torturer’s step-wise preferences are [cyclical and] intransitive. All things 
considered, he prefers , to 0, / to ,, i to /, etc. . . . but certainly not ,000 to ,. [Moreover,] …his 
preferences…exhibit various kinds of indeterminacy. Not only is there no empirically determinable ﬁrst 
seRing that he disprefers to 0, there is no empirically determinable ﬁrst seRing at which these preferences 
become indeterminate. (,--0, pp. k-–1/) 
 
As Quinn notes, many theorists condemn the self-torturer’s cyclical preferences as 
irrational, because such preferences make him susceptible to being used as a money pump (see, 
for instance, Arnmenius & McCarthy ,--k, p. ,i,). But, to insist that the self-torturer get new, 
more “rational” preferences invites bad faith. After all, what we want to know is how he should 
act given the preferences that he actually has (Quinn ,--0, p. 10). What’s more, he may be powerless 
to change his preferences. Indeed, let’s assume so. Furthermore, let’s accept Quinn’s other 
assumptions. They are as follows. 
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(A,)  Practical rationality is purely instrumental such that what a subject ought to do is 
solely a function of how the relevant options compare in terms of satisfying her actual 
preferences.1  
(A/)  For any seRing n (0 ≤ n < ,,000), the self-torturer has, when at n, the option to advance 
to and then stop at n+,.2  
(Ai)  For any seRing n (0 ≤ n < ,,000), the self-torturer prefers the way the world would be 
if he were to stop at n+, to the way the world would be if he were to stop at n.3  
(As)  The self-torturer is and will forever remain both practically rational and fully 
informed such that he will, each week, perform the option that he ought to perform.4  
(Au)  The self-torturer prefers the way the world would be if he were to remain forever at 0 
to the way the world would be if he were to advance all the way to ,,000.5 
 
The central question, then, is: what, according to the purely instrumental conception of 
practical rationality, should such a person do the ﬁrst week and each subsequent week given his 
actual preferences? And let’s start with the question of whether he should advance from 0 to , 
the ﬁrst week. Unfortunately, there are seemingly plausible arguments for both a ‘yes’ answer 
and a ‘no’ answer. To illustrate, consider the following.   
 
(P,)  For any seRing n (0 ≤ n < ,,000) and any subject S who has agreed to have the self-
torture device aRached to her in return for the described conditions, S ought, when 
at n, to advance to n+, if she has, when at n, both (,) the option to advance to and 
then stop at n+, and (/) a preference for the way the world would be if she were to 
                                                        
1 Quinn says: “I am thinking of rationality (as I have been throughout) as instrumental—as something 
that is and ought to be the slave of the agent’s preferences” (,--0, p. -0). 
2 Quinn says of the self-torturer: “No inability stands in his way. It isn’t that he lacks the will-power to 
stop at some reasonable initial goal” (,--0, p. 11). 
3 Quinn says: “The self-torturer’s step-wise preferences are intransitive. All things considered, he prefers 
, to 0, / to ,, i to /, etc. …but certainly not ,000 to ,” (,--0, p. k-). 
4 Quinn rejects one proposed solution to the puzzle, because “it cannot work for a self-torturer who 
assumes that he will always act rationally” (,--0, p. 1s). I take it, then, that we are to assume that the self-
torturer will always act rationally and knows this about himself.  
5 Quinn says of the self-torturer: “if he keeps advancing, he can see that he will eventually reach seRings 
that will be so painful that he would then gladly relinquish his fortune and return to 0” (,--0, p. k-). 
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advance to and then stop at n+, over the way the world would be if she were to 
remain forever at n. [From A, and the possibilist view, which holds that, if such a 
subject has, when at n, both (,) the option to advance to and then stop at n+, and (/) 
a preference for the way the world would be if she were to advance to and then stop 
at n+, over the way the world would be if she were to remain forever at n, then she 
ought to advance to n+,, because advancing to and then stopping at n+, is beRer 
than her remaining forever at n in terms of satisfying her actual preferences] 
(P/)  For any seRing n (0 ≤ n < ,,000), the self-torturer has, when at n, both (,) the option 
to advance to and then stop at n+, and (/) a preference for the way the world would 
be if he were to advance to and then stop at n+, over the way the world would be if 
he were to remain forever at n. [Fr0m A/ and Ai] 
(C,)  Therefore, for any seRing n (0 ≤ n < ,,000), the self-torturer ought, when at n, to 
advance to n+,. [From P,–P/]  
(C/)  Therefore, the self-torturer ought, when at 0, to advance to ,. [From C,] 
(Pi)   For any seRing n, if the self-torturer is at n and ought, when at n, to advance to n+,, 
he’ll advance to n+,. [From As]  
(Ci)   Therefore, when at 0, the self-torturer will advance to ,. When at ,, he’ll advance to 
/. When at /, he’ll advance to i. …And, when at ---, he’ll advance to ,,000. [From 
C, and Pi] 
(Cs)   Therefore, if the self-torturer were to advance from 0 to ,, he wouldn’t stop until 
reaching ,,000. [From Ci] 
(Ps)  The self-torturer prefers the way the world would be if he were to remain forever at 
0 to the way the world would be if he were to advance all the way to ,,000. [From 
Au] 
(Pu)  For any subject S who has agreed to have the self-torture device aRached to her in 
return for the described conditions, if S wouldn’t stop until reaching ,,000 if she 
were to advance from 0 to ,, and if she prefers the way the world would be if she 
were to remain forever at 0 to the way the world would be if she were to advance all 
the way to ,,000, then she ought not, when at 0, to advance to ,. [From A, and the 
actualist view, which holds that, if such a subject wouldn’t stop until reaching ,,000 if 
she were to advance from 0 to ,, and if she prefers the way the world would be if 
she were to remain forever at 0 to the way the world would be if she were to 
advance all the way to ,,000, then she ought not to advance from 0 to ,, because 
remaining forever at 0 is beRer than advancing all the way to ,,000 in terms of 
satisfying her actual preferences] 
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(Cu)  Therefore, the self-torturer ought not, when at 0, to advance to ,. [From Cs, Ps, and 
Pu] 
 
Thus, this argument entails that, when at 0, the self-torturer both ought and ought not to 
advance to ,. Now, I ﬁnd it implausible to think that there could be such conﬂicting all-in, 
rational oughts. So, I take this argument to show that we must reject at least one of P, and Pu if 
we are to accept Quinn’s assumptions. After all, these two are the only two premises that are 
not simply entailed by his assumptions A,–Au. But which one should we reject? Surprisingly, 
we should reject both. Given A,, we must assume that practical rationality is purely 
instrumental such that what a subject ought to do is purely a function of how the relevant 
options compare to each other in terms of satisfying her actual preferences. But, as I’ll argue, 
neither the actualist view nor the possibilist view is correct about what we should be 
comparing. To illustrate, suppose that we’re wondering whether someone aRached to the self-
torture device should advance from 0 to , the ﬁrst week. According to the possibilist view, we 
should compare the worlds that she could actualize if she were to advance from 0 to , to the 
worlds that she could actualize if she were to refrain from advancing from 0 to ,, where which 
worlds she could actualize if she were to φ depends on what it would be possible for her to 
simultaneously and subsequently do if she were to φ. And the only world that she could 
actualize if she were to refrain from advancing from 0 to , is the world in which she remains 
forever at 0. And since this world isn’t as good as the world in which she advances to and then 
stops at , (a world that she could actualize if she were to advance from 0 to ,), the possibilist 
view implies that she should advance from 0 to ,.  
By contrast, the actualist view holds that we should instead compare the world that she 
would actualize if she were to advance from 0 to , to the world that she would actualize if she 
were to refrain from advancing from 0 to ,, where which world she would actualize if she were 
to φ depends on what she would, in actual fact, simultaneously and subsequently do if she were 
to φ. So, if, in fact, she wouldn’t stop until reaching ,,000 if she were to advance from 0 to ,, 
then we are, on the actualist view, to compare the world in which she doesn’t stop until 
reaching ,,000 to the world in which she remains forever at 0. And it’s stipulated that she 
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prefers the laRer. So, the actualist view implies that such a person (that is, a person who 
wouldn’t stop until reaching ,,000 if she were to advance from 0 to ,) should not advance from 
0 to ,.6  
Both views are, I believe, incorrect. The possibilist view is, however, the closest to being 
correct. The only problem with it is that it overlooks the fact that, in some instances, advancing 
from n to n+, is something that the subject could do only by responding inappropriately to her 
reasons. And, as I’ll argue, it can’t be that a subject ought to do what she can do only by 
responding inappropriately to her reasons. Consequently, we must, contrary to the possibilist 
view, exclude such options from the relevant comparison. For the only worlds that we should 
be comparing are those that she could actualize by responding appropriately to her reasons. 
And, so, what we should be comparing are the worlds that she could actualize by both 
responding appropriately to her reasons and advancing from n to n+, to the worlds that she 
could actualize by both responding appropriately to her reasons and refraining from advancing 
from n to n+,. The key, then, to solving the puzzle of the self-torturer is to realize that someone 
aRached to the self-torture device can’t be required to advance from n to n+, if that’s something 
that she could do only by responding inappropriately to her reasons.  
 
). Three Reasons Why φ Might Not Be What a Subject Ought to Do 
As noted, I believe that the key to solving the puzzle of the self-torturer is to realize that one 
reason why an action (such as advancing to the next seRing) might not be what the self-torturer 
ought to do is that it’s something that he could do only by responding inappropriately to his 
                                                        
6 These views are named after the following related, but distinct, views from Jackson & PargeRer ,-1|: 
“By Actualism we will mean the view that the values that should ﬁgure in determining which option is 
the best and so ought to be done out of a set of options are the values of what would be the case were the 
agent to adopt or carry out the option, where what would be the case includes of course what the agent 
would simultaneously or subsequently in fact do: the (relevant) value of an option is the value of what 
would in fact be the case were the agent to perform it. We will call the alternative view that it is only 
necessary to aRend to what is possible for the agent, Possibilism” (,-1|, p. /ii). 
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reasons. Indeed, there are, in general, at least three reasons why some possible action, φ, might 
not be what a given subject ought to do. Perhaps, the most obvious of these is the following.  
 
(R,)  φ-ing isn’t even an option for her. 
 
For instance, the reason that eﬀecting world peace is not what I ought to do is that it isn’t even 
an option for me.  
Note that I’m using ‘option’, here, as a technical term. Everyone agrees that it’s not just 
any possible event that can be what a subject ought to do. Take, for instance, the possible event 
of my walking on water. Or take the possible event of your going for a run. Or take the possible 
event of Halley’s comet colliding with Earth. None of these are eligible for the status of being 
what I ought to do. Halley’s comet colliding with Earth isn’t even something that someone can 
opt for. Your going for a run isn’t something that I can opt for. And even though my walking on 
water is something that it’s possible, in some sense, for me to opt for, the sense of ‘possibility’ 
that’s relevant in determining whether an event is eligible for being what I ought to do seems to 
be much narrower than this. For it seems that for some possible event to be something that I 
ought to perform, it must be that whether I perform it is, in the relevant sense, under my 
control.7 So, let me stipulate that φ is an option for a subject if and only if whether she performs 
it is, in the relevant sense, under her control—the relevant sense being the one that guarantees 
that ‘ought to φ’ implies ‘has the option to φ’. So, even if it’s open to debate whether ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’, there can be no doubt that ‘ought’ implies ‘option’. Thus, one obvious reason for a 
possible action’s failing to be what ought to be done is that it’s not even an option.  
 But, of course, not all options ought to be performed. So, there must be other reasons 
why some possible action, φ, might not be what a subject ought to do. Here’s another.  
 
                                                        
7 For some responses to worries about such a control condition (including both worries based on the 
thought that there’s resultant moral luck and worries based on Frankfurt’s examples involving 
counterfactual interveners), see Portmore Forthcoming (chap. /).  
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(R/)  Although φ-ing is an option for her, it’s incompatible with her performing an even 
beRer option. 
 
To illustrate, assume that I have complete control over whether I raise both, neither, or 
just one of my two arms. And assume that, in raising just one, I have complete control over 
whether it’s my left or my right arm that I raise. Lastly, assume that raising both my arms is 
beRer than every other option. In that case, refraining from raising my left arm is not what I 
ought to do, for it’s incompatible with my performing an even beRer option: that of raising both 
my arms. And this result seems to generalize. So, I think that we should accept R/.   
R, and R/ are, I believe, fairly uncontroversial. So, I haven’t actually argued for either of 
them. But I will argue that there is at least one other—admiRedly, more controversial—reason 
why a possible action, φ, might not be what a subject ought to do. It’s this.  
 
(Ri)  Although φ-ing is an option for her that isn’t incompatible with her performing an 
even beRer option, the only way for her to φ is by responding inappropriately to her 
reasons. 
 
 Why should we accept Ri? Well, consider that what determines whether oughts, 
requirements, and responsibilities apply to a given subject is whether that subject has the 
capacity for responding appropriately to reasons. Indeed, it’s the capacity for responding 
appropriately to reasons, which normal adult humans typically possess and which primitive 
animals, very young children, and the severely mentally impaired typically lack, that 
distinguishes those who can have obligations and responsibilities from those who can’t. And, 
given this, it would be nonsensical for a subject to be required to respond inappropriately to her 
reasons. For such a requirement would apply to her in virtue of her having the capacity to 
respond appropriately to reasons even though it’s only by failing to properly exercise this 
capacity that she could come to fulﬁll this requirement. And that’s implausible. For it’s 
implausible to suppose that the very capacity in virtue of which a subject is responsible for her 
failures is the one that, when exercised fully and ﬂawlessly, leads her to fail. And this holds 
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whether we’re talking about a failure to do what’s required or a failure to do what ought to be 
done. It just can’t be that what makes a subject responsible for her failures is the very thing that 
causes her to fail. And, so, it can’t be that a subject ought to do something that she could do only 
by responding inappropriately to her reasons.  
In further support of Ri, consider the following two examples. First, consider that I have 
been known to infer causation on the basis of correlation. After all, this is a fairly common 
fallacy and not one to which I’m immune. Nevertheless, it seems that I should not form the 
belief that taking a daily multivitamin causes people to live longer on the basis of my awareness 
of studies demonstrating a correlation between taking a daily multivitamin and living longer. 
So, if this is the only way for me to form this belief, then it seems that I ought not to form it. Yet, 
forming it could still be my best option (and, thus, not incompatible with my performing any 
beRer option), for suppose that this belief is both true and one that it would be beneﬁcial for me 
to form. Nevertheless, it’s not a belief that I should form if I can do so only by responding 
inappropriately to my reasons.8 For if that were the case, this would constitute a directive that I 
could comply with only by doing something that I shouldn’t do: inferring causation from 
correlation. And it’s implausible to suppose that I should do something that I could do only by 
doing something that I shouldn’t.   
Second, suppose, contrary to fact, that I sometimes commit the following practical 
fallacy: that of forming an intention to φ on the basis of both an intention to ψ and the belief that 
my ψ-ing will cause φ to occur. Suppose, then, that I sometimes form the intention to sweat on 
the basis of both an intention to run and the belief that my running will cause me to sweat. 
Now, given that I know that I can’t sweat merely by intending to sweat (at least, not directly), 
let’s assume, as seems plausible, that I can’t form the intention to sweat by responding 
appropriately to my reasons. Assume, then, that the only way for me to form this intention is by 
                                                        
     8 Given that I’m stipulating that this belief is true and one that it would be beneﬁcial for me to have, I 
concede that it would be good if I were to form this belief. I just deny that I ought to form it. For I can do 
so only by responding inappropriately to my reasons. So, this is a case where it would be rational for me 
to cause myself to be irrational by, say, taking a pill that would cause me to form this belief via a 
fallacious inference.   
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responding inappropriately to my reasons, forming it via the above practical fallacy. But, in that 
case, I don’t see how anyone could plausibly claim that I ought or am obligated to form this 
intention. For this just seems implausible given that this directive would apply to me only if I 
had the capacity to respond appropriately to my reasons, and, yet, I could comply with it only 
by failing to fully and ﬂawless exercise this capacity. Thus, I think that we should accept Ri.9 
 Now, if I’m right about R,–Ri, then not every explanation for why advancing is not 
what the self-torturer ought to do must appeal to R/ and the thought that advancing would be 
incompatible with performing an option that’s beRer in terms of satisfying his preferences. For, 
given R,, the explanation could instead appeal to the thought that advancing isn’t even an 
option for him. Of course, Quinn assumes that the self-torturer always has the option of 
advancing (at least, until he reaches ,,000). So, the thought that advancing isn’t an option for 
him is false, just as the thought that advancing is incompatible with his performing an even 
beRer option is. So, neither an appeal to R, nor an appeal to R/ is going to help us solve the 
puzzle of the self-torturer. But, fortunately, there is, I’ve argued, one other reason why 
advancing might not be what the self-torturer ought to do—that is, Ri. And, so, it could be that 
the reason that advancing to the next seRing is, in certain instances, not what the self-torturer 
ought to do is that it’s something that he could do only by responding inappropriately to his 
reasons. Indeed, I’ll argue that this is the case.   
 
?. Why We Should Reject P) 
Recall that P, says: For any seRing n (0 ≤ n < ,,000) and any subject S who has agreed to have 
the self-torture device aRached to her in return for the described conditions, S ought, when at n, 
to advance to n+, if she has, when at n, both (,) the option to advance to and then stop at n+, 
and (/) a preference for the way the world would be if she were to advance to and then stop at 
                                                        
9 See Portmore Forthcoming (chap. u) for an argument that we must accept Ri in order to accommodate 
the idea that a moral theory ought to be morally harmonious—that is, ought to be such that the agents 
who satisfy it, whoever and however numerous they may be, are guaranteed to produce the morally best 
world that they could, in the relevant sense, together produce. 
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n+, over the way the world would be if she were to remain forever at n. This premise is false. To 
see why, imagine that a subject named Quintin (meaning ‘the ﬁfth’, but I’ll use it to bring to 
mind the number u0) is now at u0, having resolved not to go beyond u0. Thus, he intends to 
resist the anticipated temptation to advance to u, in light of his having both (,) the option to 
advance to and then stop at u, and (/) a preference for the way the world would be if she were 
to advance to and then stop at u, over the way the world would be if she were to remain forever 
at u0.  
Now, P, implies that Quintin ought to advance to u,. But, as we’ll soon see, advancing 
to u, can’t be something that Quintin ought to do. To see why, consider that, given that he’s 
resolved not to go beyond u0, there are only two ways for him to advance from u0 to u,. One 
way is for him to do so unintentionally by accidentally ﬂicking the dial from u0 to u,. Call this 
The Accidental Procession to B/. The other way, of course, is for him to do so intentionally by 
reconsidering his previous resolution not to go beyond u0, thereby changing his mind and 
deciding to advance by intentionally ﬂicking the dial from u0 to u,. Call this The Reconsidered 
Procession to B/. And let’s assume that, in both instances, Quintin will remain forever at u, and 
not advance any further. Also, let’s assume that u0 and u, are both what I’ll call preferred 
stopping points, where a seRing counts as a preferred stopping point if and only if the given 
subject (determinately) prefers the world in which she stops at it both to the world in which she 
remains forever at 0 and to the world in which she advances all the way to ,,000.10 And I’ll call 
any stopping point that isn’t a preferred stopping point a dispreferred stopping point. 
 Now, I concede that the self-torturer prefers both the world in which The Accidental 
Procession to B/ occurs and the world in which The Reconsidered Procession to B/ occurs to the 
world in which he remains forever at u0. And, so, I concede that both these worlds are beRer 
than the world in which he remains forever at u0 in terms of satisfying his actual preferences. 
And, so, I admit that, if he has the option of taking a pill that would cause either The Accidental 
                                                        
10 Given Quinn’s assumptions, there is no perfect stopping point (that is, no stopping point that isn’t 
dispreferred to some alternative), because, for every seRing n (0 ≤ n ≤ ,,000), stopping at n will be 
dispreferred either to stopping at the next seRing (i.e., n+,) or to stopping at the initial seRing (i.e., 0).  
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Procession to B/ or The Reconsidered Procession to B/ to occur, he should take it. Nevertheless, I 
deny that he ought to advance from u0 t0 u,. And I can deny this even if I accept Quinn’s 
assumption that practical rationality is purely instrumental. For, as I’ve shown, even if practical 
rationality is purely instrumental, there can be reasons why an act isn’t one that ought to be 
performed that have nothing to do with how good or bad that act is in terms of satisfying the 
subject’s preferences. Indeed, I’ve argued that there are at least two such reasons: R, and Ri. 
Moreover, as I’ve just shown, there are only two ways for Quintin to advance from u0 t0 u,: The 
Accidental Procession to B/ and The Reconsidered Procession to B/. And neither can be what he 
ought to do given R, and Ri. For, as I’ll show, The Accidental Procession to B/ isn’t an option for 
him and, so, can’t be what he ought to do given R,. And although The Reconsidered Procession to 
B/ is an option for him, it is, as I’ll show, one that he can perform only by responding 
inappropriately to his reasons. So, it can’t be what he ought to do given Ri. Therefore, 
advancing to u, is not something Quintin ought to do, contrary to what P, implies. 
 Recall that an option for a subject is something she controls whether or not she performs. 
But Quintin can’t control whether he accidentally ﬂicks the dial from u0 to u,. Such an 
accidental act may count as one that he can perform, but it doesn’t count as an option for him. 
And, thus, it can’t be something that he ought to do. To illustrate, consider that although 
accidentally knocking over a glass of wine is something that I can do (indeed, it’s something 
that I have done several times), it’s not (and never has been) an option for me. For I’ve never 
had the relevant sort of control over whether I was to accidentally knock over a glass of wine—
that is, I’ve never had the sort of control that would make it eligible for being something that I 
ought to have done. Likewise, Quintin doesn’t have the relevant sort of control over whether he 
accidentally ﬂicks the dial. So, The Accidental Procession to B/ is not an option for him. And, since 
it’s not an option for him, it can’t, according to R,, be something that he ought to do. 
 The only other way for Quintin to advance from u0 to u, is to do so intentionally by 
reconsidering his previous resolution not to go beyond u0. But the whole point of his having 
made this resolution in the ﬁrst place was to prevent the anticipated inclination to advance to u, 
from thwarting his plan to stop at u0. And given that the function of a resolution is to prevent 
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such anticipated inclinations from undermining one’s ability to successfully follow through 
with one’s plans, it is, as Richard Holton has argued, contrary to reason to revise such “a 
contrary inclination defeating intention (a resolution) in response to the presence of those very 
inclinations” (/00-, p. k1). So, given that Quintin has resolved not to go beyond u0 and, so, 
intends to resist the anticipated inclination to advance to u,, he cannot now advance to u, in 
response to that very inclination except by responding inappropriately to the decisive reason 
that he has for not doing so. And, since, as Rs states, no act that can be performed only by 
responding inappropriately to one’s reasons can be something that one ought to do, it can’t be 
that Quintin ought to advance to u, via The Reconsidered Procession to B/. 
 Here, I’m relying on the following principle (call it the no-reconsideration principle): 
Assuming that a resolution was permissibly formed, a subject has decisive reason not to 
reconsider it in response to the very inclinations that it was intended to rebuﬀ—unless, that is, 
something relevant has changed or is not as was anticipated (in other words, not if the subject’s 
preference ranking has changed or the force of the relevant inclinations is much greater than 
was anticipated). This principle implies that Quintin has decisive reason not to reconsider his 
resolution to stop at u0 in response to his inclination to get an additional $,0,000, for let’s 
assume, as seems plausible, that his resolution was permissibly formed, that nothing relevant 
has changed since it was formed, and that everything is as he had anticipated it would be when 
he formed it. The idea, then, is that he shouldn’t now reconsider his resolution in response to 
the very inclination that it was meant to overcome, for nothing relevant (including how he 
ranks the end of ensuring that he doesn’t end up at some dispreferred stopping point above the 
end of geRing an additional $,0,000) has changed. Moreover, everything (including the force of 
his inclination to get an additional $,0,000 by advancing) is exactly as he had anticipated it 
would be.  
 Since this principle may not be entirely uncontroversial, I should explain why I accept it. 
The main reason for accepting it has nothing to do with either the thought that good 
consequences will come from being generally disposed to abide it or the thought that a subject 
will likely regret how things turn out if she doesn’t abide by it. Rather, the main reason for 
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accepting it is simply that it’s intuitive. That is, it’s intuitive to think that, if the point of your 
having formed a resolution was to prevent certain anticipated inclinations from leading you to 
reconsider your original plan, then it’s irrational to reconsider that plan in response to those 
very inclinations—unless, of course, one the above caveats obtains. This and the fact that the 
principle has plausible implications seems to constitute suﬃcient reason for accepting it.  
With respect to its plausible implications, note that it doesn’t imply that resolutions 
should never be reconsidered, but only that they should never be reconsidered in response to 
the very inclinations that they were intended to deﬂect—at least, not when they were 
permissibly formed, things are as one had anticipated that they would be, and nothing relevant 
has changed since they were formed. Also, note that this principle doesn’t have the same 
problematic implications that a similar principle has. That principle (and call it the problematic 
principle) states that, “other things being equal, one should not reconsider a resolution, since this 
defeats the point of having formed the resolution” (/0,s, p. /1i). As Chrisoula Andreou 
explains, this principle is problematic.  
 
Suppose A wants B to go to a yoga retreat during spring break, but A also knows that B will want to use 
the time to work on her dissertation. Suppose further that A goes ahead and makes all the necessary 
reservations. But B, ﬁnding herself inclined to work on her dissertation, insists that the reservations be 
cancelled. The question then arises as to whether B is being irrational. …It is proposed [on the problematic 
principle] that B can be charged with being irrational because cancelling the reservations would defeat the 
purpose of A’s having made them, which is for B to go to a yoga retreat during spring break. [Yet, 
this]…charge of irrationality seems particularly diﬃcult to defend if it is granted that, were B to consider 
the maRer carefully rather than just going along with A’s plan, we can expect that rational deliberation 
would prompt B to side with her inclination and rank working on her dissertation above going to the yoga 
retreat. (/0,s, p. /1s) 
 
Andreou believes that, even if we take A and B to be time-slices of the same person, we 
should not accept, as the problematic principle implies, that B should not reconsider her 
resolution just because her doing so would defeat the point A had in forming this resolution. 
And I agree. But note that my no-reconsideration principle doesn’t have this implausible 
implication, for something relevant has changed since A made her resolution. For whereas her 
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earlier self (viz., A) ranked the end of B’s going to the yoga retreat above B’s working on her 
dissertation, her current self (viz., B) has the opposite ranking.11  
Of course, if we want to test the implications of the no-reconsideration principle, we 
could just modify Andreou’s original example to the point where the no-reconsideration 
principle would then imply that B should not reconsider A’s resolution. We can, thereby, test 
whether this implication is intuitively plausible in such a modiﬁed case. To do so, let’s assume 
that her earlier self (viz., A) made the resolution with the intention of preventing the anticipated 
future inclination to spend her spring break working on her dissertation from stopping her 
from following through on her plan to go to the yoga retreat. Let’s assume that she made this 
resolution with the intention of ensuring that she doesn’t get burnt out working on her 
dissertation. And let’s assume that both her earlier and later selves rank the end of ensuring that 
she doesn’t get burnt out working on her dissertation above the end of spending her spring 
break working on her dissertation. Now, if we make these modiﬁcations, we ﬁnd that the no-
reconsideration principle now implies that B ought not to reconsider A’s resolution to go to the 
yoga retreat in response to the inclination that she has to spend her spring break working on the 
dissertation. But, in this case, the implication seems entirely plausible. So, it seems that the no-
reconsideration principle is not only intuitive in its own right, but also intuitive in its 
implications.12  
To sum up, then, we must reject P, for it implies that Quintin ought to do something 
(viz., advance from u0 to u,) that he can do only either accidentally or by responding 
                                                        
11 Unlike some others, I don’t ﬁnd that it’s necessarily irrational to reconsider a resolution in light of a 
change in one’s preference ranking even if that resolution was formed with the intention of keeping such 
a change from preventing one from following through with the original plan. As Andreou’s case 
illustrates, such a change can make it rational to reconsider such a resolution. Moreover, the no-
reconsideration principle explicitly allows for the possibility that such a change is a relevant one. Lastly, 
given all this, it’s important to note that, in the case of the self-torturer, his preference ranking never 
changes. At all times, he prefers 0 to ,,000 but , to o, / to ,, i to /, …, and ,,ooo to ---. 
12 Note that my no-reconsideration principle includes caveats that Holton’s doesn’t. Consequently, I take 
my principle to be immune to the sorts of counterintuitive implications that others have suggested that 
Holton’s view has—see, for instance, Paul /0,,, p. 1-/. 
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inappropriately to his reasons. For, given R, and Ri, neither can be something that he ought to 
do.  
 
C. Why We Should Reject PD 
We should also reject Pu. Recall that Pu says: For any subject S who has agreed to have the self-
torture device aRached to her in return for the described conditions, if S wouldn’t stop until 
reaching ,,000 if she were to advance from 0 to ,, and if she prefers the way the world would be 
if she were to stop at 0 to the way the world would be if she were to advance all the way to 
,,000, then she ought not, when at 0, to advance to ,. To see that this premise is false, imagine 
that there is a subject named Imprudus (for being imprudent) who (,) has agreed to have this 
device aRached to him in return for the described conditions, (/) possesses all the preferences 
that the original self-torturer possesses, and (i) would end up advancing all the way to ,,000 if 
he were to advance from 0 to ,. Now, Pu implies that Imprudus shouldn’t advance from 0 to ,. 
But, as I’ll show, this is false. And, so, we must reject Pu. 
 Let’s assume both that Imprudus is now at 0 and that u0 is, for some reason, the only 
preferred stopping point for him. Let’s also assume that Imprudus (,) has the option of 
advancing to and then stopping at u0, (/) would advance from 0 to u0 and then stop there so 
long as he now resolves to stop there, (i) would now resolve to stop at u0 if he were now to 
respond appropriately to his reasons—recall that u0 is the only preferred stopping point for 
him, and (s) prefers the way the world would be if he were to advance from 0 to u0 and then 
stop there to the way the world be if he were to just remain forever at o. Given ,–s, it seems 
clear that Imprudus ought to advance from 0 to u0 while resolving to stop there. Yet, even so, Pu 
implies that Imprudus ought not to advance from 0 to , given that he’s not going to respond 
appropriately to his reasons and, so, is not going to resolve to stop at u0. Consequently, he 
would, as a maRer of fact, advance all the way to ,,000 if he were to advance from 0 to ,.  
 The problem for the proponent of Pu is that she cannot accept both of the following two 
highly plausible claims: (claim,) Imprudus ought to advance from 0 to u0 while resolving to 
stop there and (claim/) joint satisﬁability, which holds that if a subject both ought to φ and ought 
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to ψ, then she has the option of both φ-ing and ψ-ing. For if she accepts claim, (and it seems that 
we all should), she must deny claim/ given Pu’s implication that Imprudus ought not to 
advance from 0 to ,. After all, Imprudus doesn’t have the option of both (,) not advancing from 
0 to , and (/) advancing from 0 to u0 while resolving to stop there. Thus, the proponent of Pu 
must reject joint satisﬁability given that she should accept claim,. But even if joint satisﬁability 
isn’t entirely uncontroversial (see, e.g., White /0,ka), we should accept it given the following 
argument.13  
 
(P|) It is not the case that <if a subject both ought to φ and ought to ψ, then she has 
the option of both φ-ing and ψ-ing>. In other words, there is a subject who both 
ought to φ and ought to ψ but doesn’t have the option of both φ-ing and ψ-ing. 
[Assumption for reductio] 
(C1) Thus, if this subject believes what’s true, she’ll believe that she doesn’t have the 
option of both φ-ing and ψ-ing. [From P|] 
(Pk) For all actions x and all subjects S, if S ought to do x, then she ought to intend to 
do something that entails her doing x. [From the fact that practical oughts are 
normative for intentions—more on this below] 
(C-) Thus, if this subject intends to do all that she ought to intend to do, she will both 
intend to do something that entails her φ-ing and intend to do something that 
entails her ψ-ing. [From P| and Pk] 
(C,0) Thus, if this subject believes what’s true and intends to do all that she ought to 
intend to do, she’ll believe that she doesn’t have the option of both φ-ing and ψ-
ing while both intending to do something that entails her φ-ing and intending to 
do something that entails her ψ-ing. [From C1 and C-] 
(P1) A subject who believes that she doesn’t have the option of both φ-ing and ψ-ing 
while both intending to do something that entails her φ-ing and intending to do 
something that entails her ψ-ing has an irrational set of beliefs and intentions—
                                                        
     13 This argument is, in part, inspired by one found in KieseweRer Forthcoming, which is a response to 
White /0,ka. It diﬀers from his, though, in that it concerns the objective (i.e., fact-relative) ought.   
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that is, a set of beliefs and intentions that she ought not to have. [From the 
consistency requirement on beliefs and intentions14] 
(C,,) Thus, if this subject believes what’s true and intends to do all that she ought to 
intend to do, then she’ll have an irrational set of beliefs and intentions. [From 
C,0 and P1] 
(P-) It’s not the case that <if this subject believes what’s true and intends to do all that 
she ought to intend to do, she’ll have an irrational set of beliefs and intentions>. 
For it’s implausible to suppose that a subject who believes what’s true and 
intends to do all that she ought to intend to do has an irrational set of beliefs and 
intentions. [Assumption] 
(C,/) Therefore, if a subject both ought to φ and ought to ψ, then she has the option of 
both φ-ing and ψ-ing. [From P|–P- by reductio]  
 
The two most controversial premises are, I believe, Pk and P1. I’ll take each in turn. Pk is 
entailed on the view that practical oughts are normative for intentions. The intuitive idea 
behind this view is that, if you ought to perform some action, then, given that it couldn’t be that 
you ought to perform it unintentionally, you ought to form the intention to perform it—or, at 
least, the intention to perform something that entails performing it, which is what’s required for 
performing intentionally.15 Nevertheless, there may seem to be counterexamples to this view. 
For one, it may seem that I ought to act spontaneously even if it’s not the case that I ought to 
form the intention to do so given that such an intention would only be self-defeating. But we 
                                                        
     14 According to this requirement, a subject must be such that the set consisting of the propositional 
contents of all her beliefs and all her intentions is logically consistent, where the propositional content of 
one’s belief that p is ‘p’ and the propositional content of one’s intention to φ is ‘one will φ’. Thus, the 
propositional content of one’s intention to do something that entails one’s φ-ing entails the proposition 
‘one will φ’. Proponents of this requirement include Michael Bratman (,-1k & /00-), Jacob Ross (/00-), 
and Ralph Wedgwood (/00k, p. ,0-). And note that accepting this requirement doesn’t entail accepting 
the metaphysical view that intending to φ involves, or consists in, believing that one will φ. Rather, it 
entails accepting only the normative view that intending to φ rationally requires one to believe that one 
will φ.  
     15 For any subject S and any two of her options φ and ψ, S’s φ-ing entails S’s ψ-ing if and only if S 
doesn’t have the option of φ-ing without ψ-ing. And, to save words, I will sometimes say ‘φ-ing entails ψ-
ing’ instead of ‘S’s φ-ing entails S’s ψ-ing’.  
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should deny that I ought to act spontaneously if this isn’t something that I could do 
intentionally. For, in that case, acting spontaneously doesn’t seem to be a genuine option for me. 
Thus, we should hold, instead, only that I ought to perform (intentionally) some distinct act that 
would increase my chances of unintentionally acting spontaneously—e.g., the act of consuming 
a few stiﬀ drinks. For another, it may seem that I ought to refrain from torturing children even 
though it’s not the case that I ought to form the intention to refrain from torturing children. 
After all, the thought of torturing children should be unthinkable—at least, in any typical 
context. So, if I need to form the intention to refrain from torturing children to prevent myself 
from doing so, then something has gone terribly wrong. But although I admit that something 
has gone wrong if I need to form this speciﬁc intention, it still seems to me that I ought to form 
some (more general) intention that entails my refraining from torturing children—perhaps, the 
intention to avoid hurting others. In any case, if I do ﬁnd myself tempted to torture children, I 
should certainly resolve (and thereby intend) to refrain from doing so.16 So, neither of these 
putative counterexamples turn out to be persuasive upon reﬂection. And, so, I believe that we 
must accept Pk. 
 P1 is entailed by the view that any set of beliefs and/or intentions whose propositional 
contents are logically inconsistent is irrational. Yet, here too, there may seem to be some 
putative counterexamples to this, the consistency requirement on beliefs and intentions. One 
putative counterexample is the preface paradox. Imagine that a non-ﬁction writer apologizes in 
the preface of her book for the extremely likely fact (given her inductive evidence) that at least 
one of the other claims in the book is false, and false despite her best eﬀorts to carefully research 
each one. So, either this set of beliefs consisting in her believing each one of these other claims is 
irrational or the consistency requirement is false. And it may seem that, given how carefully 
she’s researched each one of her claims, there’s nothing irrational about her believing each one. 
It may seem, therefore, that we should reject the consistency requirement.  
                                                        
     16 A resolution to φ consists in both a ﬁrst-order intention to φ and a second-order intention not to let 
that ﬁrst-order intention be deﬂected by the anticipated future inclinations not to φ—see Holton /00-, pp. 
,,–,/.   
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But this is, in fact, no counterexample to the consistency requirement. For although it 
may be subjectively rational for her to believe all these other claims, it is irrational for her to 
believe all of them—at least, it is in the objective (fact-relative) senses of ‘rational’, ‘irrational’, 
‘ought’, and ‘ought not’ that I’m employing throughout this paper. For we’re assuming that 
some of these other claims are false, and one (objectively) ought not to believe a false claim. 
That is, it’s objectively irrational to believe a false claim. So, although she’s right to believe that 
not all the other claims in the book are true (assuming that this is so), she’s wrong to believe all 
of them—speciﬁcally, she’s wrong to believe the false ones.  
Nevertheless, there are other putative counterexamples to the consistency requirement. 
Consider, for instance, the Cathedral Paradox.  
 
Susan is planning her trip to Europe. There are /0 cathedrals she would like to visit. Each one has a fee. She really 
would like to see each one…. [But] she can only aﬀord ,- cathedrals…. Let the cathedrals number , through /0. And let 
φn be the action of visiting cathedral n. Susan intends φ,, intends φ/, ..., and intends φ/0. However, Susan knows that it 
is impossible for her to perform the conjunctive action φ,, ..., and φ/0. She simply doesn’t have the cash. And so Susan 
plans to skip at least one cathedral, intending the action: not φ, or ... or not φ/0. (Goldstein /0,|, p. /)  
 
Either Susan ought not to have all these intentions or the consistency requirement is false. And 
since there seems to be nothing subjectively irrational about her having all these intentions, it 
may seem that we must reject the consistency requirement. But this too is no counterexample to 
the consistency requirement. For although it is subjectively rational for her to have all these 
intentions, it is objectively irrational for her to have all of them. After all, she will not, in fact, 
visit all twenty cathedrals. And, so, she objectively ought not to intend to visit whichever 
cathedral it is that she’ll in fact skip.  
But what if we suppose that there is no fact of maRer as to which cathedral she’ll skip—
perhaps, which cathedral she’ll skip depends on some quantum indeterminacy. Suppose, then, 
that there is, for each cathedral, a ,-in-n objective chance that she’ll have to skip it.17 In that case, 
                                                        
     17 The objective probability that some event will (or would) occur is the percentage of the time that it 
will (or would) occur under identical causal circumstances—circumstances where the causal laws and 
histories are exactly the same.   
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it may seem that, given the low objective probability that she’ll have to skip any given 
cathedral, she should intend to visit each one—and if you deny that the objective probability is 
low enough where n equals /0, then just change the example so that n equals, say, twenty 
thousand or more. Perhaps, doing this makes for a more plausible counterexample, but I doubt 
it. In this case, we have to acknowledge that it’s not entirely up to Susan which cathedral she 
skips or which cathedrals she visits. Consequently, we should deny that she objectively ought to 
intend to visit each one. Instead, we should hold only that she objectively ought, for each 
cathedral, to intend to try to visit it. For, in this case, what’s up to her (and, thus, what’s an 
option for her) is not whether she visits a given cathedral but only whether she tries to visit it.   
To sum up, I’ve shown that Pu implies that it can’t be that claim, and claim/ are both 
true. Yet, claim, is incontrovertibly true. And, as I’ve argued, claim/ is also true. So, we must 
reject Pu. 
 
E. The Compromise View and Why Its Superior to Its Rivals 
We should, I believe, replace P, and Pu with the following conjunctive view: (conjunct,) For any 
preferred stopping point and any subject S who has agreed to have the self-torture device 
aRached to her in return for the described conditions, S is required to select, when necessary, 
some particular preferred stopping point and to resolve to stop there.18 And, (conjunct/) for any 
seRing n (0 ≤ n < ,,000), she ought to advance from n to n+, if and only if she has not violated 
the requirement stated in conjunct, and can intentionally advance from n to n+, without 
violating the no-reconsideration principle. I will call this the compromise view, because it’s a 
compromise between the possibilist view and the actualist view—the views that give rise to P, 
and Pu, respectively. Like the possibilist view, the compromise view holds that such a subject 
should typically advance from n to n+, if she has, when at n, both (,) the option to advance to 
                                                        
     18 It becomes necessary to select some particular preferred stopping point and to resolve to stop there 
when advancing to the next seRing without doing so risks one’s advancing beyond any preferred 
stopping point. And note that I take no stand on whether there is any non-arbitrary way to select a 
particular preferred stopping point.   
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and then stop at n+, and (/) a preference for the way the world would be if she were to advance 
to and then stop at n+, over the way the world would be if she were to remain forever at n. But, 
unlike the possibilist view, it makes an exception when doing so intentionally would require 
reconsidering a previous resolution in response to the very inclination that it was intended to 
overcome. And, like the actualist view, it requires her to respond to her situation in a way that 
ensures that she won’t advance to ,,000 or any other dispreferred stopping point. But, unlike 
the actualist view, it doesn’t do this by forbidding her from advancing from n to n+, if, in fact, 
doing this would lead to her advancing to some dispreferred stopping point. Instead, it does 
this by requiring her to form, when necessary, a resolution that will ensure that she doesn’t 
advance to any dispreferred stopping point. Thus, in the above example, Imprudus ought to 
advance from 0 to , even though he would, as a maRer of fact, advance all the way to ,,000 if he 
were to do so. But, on the compromise view, he’s required to form, when necessary, a resolution 
that will prevent him from advancing to any dispreferred stopping point. Thus, on the 
compromise view, the mere fact that he’s not going to form the resolution that he’s required to 
form doesn’t imply that it’s impermissible for him to advance from 0 to ,. It just implies that it’s 
impermissible for him to do so without forming, when necessary, the resolution that will 
prevent him from advancing to any dispreferred stopping point. After all, he’s perfectly capable 
of advancing from 0 to , while resolving to stop at some particular preferred stopping point, 
and doing this will ensure that he doesn’t advance to any dispreferred stopping point.   
 The compromise view is, I believe, intuitively plausible. It holds that any subject who 
has agreed to have the self-torture device aRached to her in return for the described conditions 
should advance each week until reaching the particular preferred stopping point that she has 
resolved not to go beyond. And it holds that she should ensure that she doesn’t advance to any 
dispreferred stopping point by forming, when necessary, a resolution to stop at some particular 
preferred stopping point. Thus, it prohibits her from advancing to ,,000 or to any other 
dispreferred stopping point. Indeed, it prohibits her from advancing to even some preferred 
stopping point unless she either has already formed a resolution that will prevent her from 
advancing to any dispreferred stopping point or can do so without the risk of ending up at any 
dispreferred stopping point.  
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 Of course, many will wonder why we should accept the compromise view’s implication 
that such a subject shouldn’t advance beyond the particular preferred stopping point that she’s 
resolved to stop at. For instance, many will wonder why Quintin—who has resolved to stop at 
u0—shouldn’t advance from u0 to u, given that he has both (,) the option to advance to and 
then stop at u, and (/) a preference for the way the world would be if she were to advance to 
and then stop at u, over the way the world would be if she were to remain forever at u0. For, as 
some philosophers have pointed out, this implication “stands in need of defense” (Tenenbaum 
& Raﬀman /0,/, p. ,01) given that we’re assuming that what Quintin ought to do is simply a 
function of how the relevant options compare in terms of satisfying his actual preferences. But 
we can provide the required defense by appealing to the fact that we shouldn’t be comparing 
the option of stopping at u0 with the option of reneging on his resolution and advancing to u,. 
We shouldn’t be comparing these two, because the laRer isn’t a relevant option. For I’ve argued 
that only those actions that can be performed intentionally without responding inappropriately 
to one’s reasons count as relevant to making such a comparison. So, although his stopping at u, 
is beRer than his stopping at u0 in terms of satisfying his actual preferences, his advancing to u, 
can’t be what he ought to do given that it’s something he can do intentionally only by 
responding inappropriately to the decisive reason that he has to refrain from reconsidering his 
resolution not to advance in response to the very inclinations that it was intended to overcome. 
Thus, I deny Stephen J. White’s claim that “when the time comes for one to carry out a prior 
plan, if it’s obvious that one’s interests would be beRer served by revising that plan, then that’s 
what one should do” (/0,u, p. u).19 Indeed, this is clearly false. For one, revising that plan can’t 
be what one ought to do if one doesn’t even have the option of revising that plan—see R,. And 
that’s true even if revising that plan would beRer serve one’s interests. For another, revising that 
plan can’t be what one ought to do if one can do so only by responding inappropriately to one’s 
reasons—see Ri. Thus, I think that we can meet the demand for a defense of the above 
                                                        
     19 Michael Huemer makes a similar assumption: “If one has a choice between A and B, and one 
rationally prefers A to B, it is rational to choose A” (/0,1, p. -s). Yet, it’s clearly irrational to respond 
inappropriately to one’s reasons, and sometimes one can choose the preferred option only by responding 
inappropriately to one’s reasons.   
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implication by appealing to Ri and the fact that, given Quintin’s resolution to stop at u0, he can 
revise that plan only by responding inappropriately to the decisive reason he has to refrain from 
doing so.  
 Another merit of the compromise view is that it conforms to what Sergio Tenenbaum 
and Diana Raﬀman (/0,/) call non-segmentation. Non-segmentation is a claim about the 
following sort of one-oﬀ case. Suppose that a subject is oﬀered only a single choice: either (A) 
have the self-torturer device set permanently to n and receive n × $,0,000 or (B) have the device 
set permanently to n+, and receive $,0,000 in addition to that sum (that is, $,0,000 + [n × 
$,0,000]). Non-segmentation is the claim that for no seRing n (0 ≤ n < ,,000) would it be 
irrational for such a subject to choose B. Now, the compromise view conforms to this claim, 
because this view holds that the only reason that it would be irrational for a subject to act so as 
to end up at n+, instead of n is that she could do so only by reneging on some resolution that 
she was required to form. But since conjunct, of the compromise view doesn’t require a subject 
facing such a one-oﬀ choice to form any resolution, choosing B will never involve reneging on a 
resolution that she was required to form.  
 The compromise view also respects Stephen White’s generality constraint. According to 
this constraint, a satisfactory solution to the self-torturer puzzle must “explain why going all the 
way to ,000 is irrational in all cases where the self-torturer has the relevant preferences and is 
fully informed about the relevant facts” (/0,kb, p. u11). And, in particular, such a solution must 
be able to explain what has gone wrong in the following sort of case. Imagine that a man named 
Moros (a name associated with ‘impending doom’ in Greek mythology) agrees to have the self-
torture device aRached to him in return for the described conditions and sets oﬀ advancing each 
week without ever coming up with any plan about how to advance. Assume that “he just 
ﬁgures he’ll stop advancing the dial at some point before the pain gets too bad. Suppose he’s 
wrong about this, though. Every week he decides to take the money and he ﬁnally ends up at 
the last seRing, in horrible pain and wishing he’d never agreed to play this twisted game” 
(/0,kb, p. u1-). As White points out, Moros hasn’t violated any principle of rational intention-
revision—such as my no-reconsideration principle. And, given this, many plan-based views—
 25 
that is, views that hold that “the self-torturer should (a) adopt a reasonable plan at the outset 
about when to stop, and (b) stick to that plan” (/0,kb, p. u1|)—will be at a loss to explain which 
week he went wrong in advancing. Yet, clearly, there must have been some week where he 
shouldn’t have advanced if he ends up wishing he had never agreed to play the “game” in the 
ﬁrst place. Fortunately, the compromise view can account for this. For, according to conjunct/, 
Moros ought not to have advanced any of those weeks in which he had violated the 
requirement stated in conjunct,—the requirement to form, when necessary, a resolution to stop 
at some particular preferred stopping point. So, he went wrong in advancing each of those 
weeks in which he advanced having already violated the requirement stated in conjunct,. And 
since he did end up at a dispreferred stopping point, it was clearly necessary for him (and, thus, 
a requirement for him) to have formed a resolution to prevent him from doing so.  
 The compromise view is not only intuitively plausible in its own right, but it’s also 
superior to its rivals from the literature. For each of its rivals are, I’ll argue, subject to one or 
more signiﬁcant ﬂaws. Perhaps, the worst ﬂaw of them all is to fail to even address the central 
issue at hand, which, as you’ll recall, is: What, according to the purely instrumental conception 
of practical rationality, should the self-torturer do this, the ﬁrst, week and each subsequent 
week given his actual preferences? I call this ‘Flaw ,’ or ‘F,’ for short. Views with F, include the 
Arnmenius-McCarthy view (,--k). For although their view tells us that the self-torturer’s 
preferences are irrational and, so, must be changed, it doesn’t tell us what he should do given 
his actual preferences, or what he should do if he’s powerless to change them. It doesn’t, for 
instance, tell us whether he should advance from 0 to , the ﬁrst week. Another view with F, is 
the Raﬀman-Tenenbaum view (/0,/). Their view tells us that, each week, the self-torturer has a 
permission to advance but that the self-torturer is obligated not to exercise all these 
permissions. Thus, their view tells us, among other things, that the self-torturer is prohibited 
from performing various series of actions (such as the series that entails his exercising all these 
permissions), but it doesn’t tell us whether he ought, a given week, to advance to the next 
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seRing.20 So, like the Arnmenius-McCarthy view, it fails to answer Quinn’s central question. 
Thus, I take such views, although interesting in their own right, to be inadequate.  
 Other rival views suﬀer the same ﬂaw that Pu suﬀers from: the ﬂaw of denying that both 
of the following highly plausible claims are true: (claim,) Imprudus ought to advance from 0 to 
u0 while resolving to stop there and (claim/) joint satisﬁability, which, you’ll recall, holds that if 
a subject both ought to φ and ought to ψ, then she has the option of both φ-ing and ψ-ing. And I 
call this ‘Flaw /’ or ‘F/’ for short. Views with F/ include Chrisoula Andreou’s interpretation of 
the standard view (/00|). On the standard view, an agent ought to φ if and only if her φ-ing 
would serve her concerns well. And, on Andreou’s interpretation of this view, her φ-ing would 
serve her concerns well if and only if her φ-ing would be part of her performing an action or a 
course of action that would serve her concerns well.21 So, on Andreou’s interpretation of the 
standard view, Imprudus ought not to advance from 0 to , given that, as a maRer of fact, he 
would end up advancing all the way to ,,000 if he were to do so. For given that he would end 
up advancing all the way to ,,000, his advancing from 0 to , would seem to be part of his 
                                                        
20 White makes a similar criticism in his /0,kb. Also, note that Raﬀman and Tenenbaum would likely 
object that their stated facts about the self-torturer’s permissions and obligations are the only normative 
facts about this case. But I take myself to have shown that there are additional normative facts about what 
the self-torturer ought to do each week.  
21 Technically, what she says is: “whether an action serves the agent’s concerns well [or, more precisely, at 
least as well as the alternative available moves] depends on what action(s) or course(s) of action it is part 
of” (/00|, p. u-s)—and note that the brackets are in the original. But this doesn’t allow us to assess 
prospective actions. For a prospective action isn’t one that’s been performed, and, so, we can’t say what 
courses of action it is a part of but only what courses of action it could or would be a part of if it were 
performed. Of course, Andreou may just want to deny the possibility of assessing an act such as 
advancing from 0 to , independent of its being a part of some larger course of action. This is suggested by 
the following passage: “Without any information about what larger action or course of action, if any, 
Tanya’s picking up the tempting shot of tequila is part of, we can safely say that Tanya’s picking up the 
shot, considered in and of itself, does not serve her concerns at all” (/00|, p. u-1). Perhaps, then, she thinks 
that we can say only that Imprudus ought not to advance from 0 to , as part of going all the way to ,,000 
but ought to advance from 0 to , as part of going to, and then stopping at, u0. Perhaps, then, she would 
deny that we can say whether Imprudus ought to advance from o to ,, considered in and of itself. But, in 
that case, I think that her view suﬀers from F,. It fails to answer questions such as the following: “Should 
Imprudus advance from 0 to , the ﬁrst week?” This is the sort of question that Quinn and I want an 
answer to. 
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advancing to ,,000, which is not a course of action that would serve his concerns well. But, 
given that Imprudus has the option of advancing from 0 to u0 while resolving to stop there and 
would end up stopping at u0 if he takes this option, it seems that everyone should admit that 
Imprudus ought to advance from 0 to u0 while resolving to stop there. And if the proponent of 
this interpretation of the standard view admits this, then, given that she must also hold both 
that he ought to refrain from advancing from 0 to , and that he doesn’t have the option of both 
refraining from advancing from 0 to , and advancing from 0 to u0 while resolving to stop there, 
she’ll be forced to deny joint satisﬁability, which, I’ve argued, she can’t plausibly deny.  
 Still other rival views suﬀer the same ﬂaw that P, suﬀers from: the ﬂaw of allowing that 
the self-torturer could be permiRed to do something that he can do only by responding 
inappropriately to his reasons. I call this ‘Flaw i’ or ‘Fi’ for short. Views with Fi include 
Stephen White’s view (White /0,kb). He holds that “in deciding whether to advance from his 
current seRing (n) to the next one (n+,), the self-torturer may do so if and only if advancing 
from n to n+, would have ﬁgured as a step in a plan he would have been rationally permiRed to 
adopt at the outset” (/0,kb, p. u-u). On this view, the self-torturer is, for any seRing n (0 ≤ n < 
,,000), permiRed to advance from n to n+, even if the only way for him to do so intentionally is 
by responding inappropriately to the decisive reason that he has to refrain from reconsidering 
his previous resolution not to go beyond n. Thus, White’s view fails to acknowledge that a 
subject can’t be permiRed to do what she can do only by responding inappropriately to her 
reasons.22  
 White’s view has a further ﬂaw. It fails to take seriously Quinn’s assumption that 
practical rationality is purely instrumental. I call this ‘Flaw s’ or ‘Fs’ for short. White’s view has 
this ﬂaw, for it fails to explain why the fact that the self-torturer’s advancing from n to n+, 
                                                        
22 AdmiRedly, the claim that a subject cannot be permiRed to do what she can do only by responding 
inappropriately to her reasons is a stronger claim than Rs. But I think that it’s equally plausible. For if I 
were permiRed to do what I could do only by responding inappropriately to my reasons, then, given that 
I’m required to φ just when φ is my only permissible option, I would be required to do something that I 
could do only by responding inappropriately to my reasons when this option is my only permissible 
option. But, as Rs implies, I can’t be required to do what I can do only by responding inappropriately to 
my reasons. (I’m assuming, here, that if I’m required to φ, then I ought to φ.) 
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doesn’t ﬁgure as a step in any plan he was rationally permiRed to adopt at the outset is relevant 
to the permissibility of his so advancing. For what does this fact have to do with how the 
relevant options compare in terms of satisfying his actual preferences? For suppose, he is at -00 
and is deciding whether to advance to -0,. And suppose that he doesn’t care whether 
advancing to -0, would ﬁgure as a step in a plan that he was rationally permiRed to adopt at 
the outset. Why, then, would this fact have anything do with whether he’s permiRed, on a 
purely instrumental conception of practical rationality, to advance from -00 to -0,? It seems 
that it doesn’t.  
Of course, White holds that which plans the self-torturer can, at the outset, permissibly 
adopt is entirely dependent on how the available plans compare to each other in terms of 
satisfying his preferences. But we’re not asking which of the available plans the self-torturer is 
permiRed to adopt at the outset. We’re asking whether he’s permiRed to advance from -00 to 
-0,. And given that he has no preference for acting in accord with a plan that he was rationally 
permiRed to adopt at the outset, I don’t see how this has anything to do with how his current 
set of options (that is, advance or don’t advance from -00 to -0,) compare in terms of satisfying 
his actual preferences. So, White fails to explain how we can take such a fact to be relevant if 
we’re assuming A,—that is, if we’re assuming that practical rationality is purely instrumental. 
Thus, White’s view fails to respect one of Quinn’s key assumptions: namely, A,.23  
By contrast, my view respects A, in that I accept that whether the self-torturer ought to 
advance a given week is solely a function of how the relevant options at present compare to 
each other in terms of satisfying his actual preferences. It’s just that I deny that things like The 
Accidental Procession to B/ and The Reconsidered Procession to B/ are relevant options. I’ve argued 
that The Accidental Procession to B/ isn’t a relevant option, because it isn’t even an option. And 
I’ve argued that The Reconsidered Procession to B/ isn’t a relevant option, because it isn’t the sort 
                                                        
23 Of course, White may think both (,) that, if we accept all of Quinn’s assumptions, then there can be no 
satisfactory solution to the puzzle and (/) that, for this reason, we should deny A,. But, as I’ve argued 
here, we can accept all of Quinn’s assumptions and still come up with a satisfactory solution.  
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option that could be what he ought to perform given that he can perform it only by responding 
inappropriately to his reasons.   
 Another view with Fs is Erik Carlson’s view (Carlson ,--|). His is a complicated view, 
but, for our purposes, what maRers is only that it holds that, for any seRing n (0 ≤ n < ,,000), the 
self-torturer’s advancing from n to n+, is permissible only if n+, is not greater than k (where k is 
less than ,,000). The problem is that Carlson fails to explain why the fact that n+, is not greater 
than k is relevant to the permissibility of his advancing from n to n+,. For what does this fact 
have to do with how the relevant options compare in terms of satisfying his actual preferences? 
Indeed, whether n+, is greater than k seems to have nothing to do with how the relevant 
options compare in terms of satisfying his actual preferences. So, Carlson’s view also fails to 
respect A,.  
 Other rival views suﬀer from a ﬁfth ﬂaw (‘Fu’ for short) in that they hold, implausibly, 
that it could never be permissible for the self-torturer to advance from 0 to , without ﬁrst 
selecting some particular seRing and resolving not to go beyond it. Such views are subject to the 
following counterexample. Imagine that a subject named Prudus (for being prudent) agrees to 
have the self-torture device aRached to him in return for the described conditions. And imagine 
that he advances from 0 to , with only a vague plan to stop somewhere well short of any 
dispreferred stopping point. And assume that he ends up stopping at some preferred stopping 
point—and, thus, he never violates the requirement stated in conjunct,. Contrary to such views, 
it seems that he was right to advance from 0 to ,. But, on those plan-based views that insist that 
the self-torturer not advance even from 0 to , without ﬁrst forming a resolution to stop at some 
particular preferred stopping point, this is false. And this is implausible given that, in some 
instances (such as Prudus’s), forming such a resolution is unnecessary for ensuring that he stops 
at some preferred stopping point.24   
 Lastly, some rival views suﬀer from a sixth ﬂaw (‘F|’ for short) in that they hold that 
there is never any option that the self-torturer is permiRed to take. As Carlson (,--|, p. ,sk) has 
                                                        
24 Tenenbaum & Raﬀman make this criticism in their /0,/ (p. ,01). 
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pointed out, this is true of the following sort of maximizing theory: for any option φ and any 
subject S, S is permiRed to φ if and only if there is no alternative option ψ such that S’s 
preferences would be beRer satisﬁed if she ψ-ed than if she φ-ed. On this theory, the self-
torturer never has a permissible option. After all, it will, on the maximizing theory, be 
impermissible for him to stop at n (0 ≤ n < ,,000) given that he could beRer satisfy his 
preferences by stopping at n+,. And it will, on the maximizing theory, also be impermissible for 
him to stop at ,,000 given that he could beRer satisfy his preferences by remaining forever at 0. 
So, every one of the self-torturer’s options (stopping at 0, stopping at ,,000, or stopping 
somewhere in between) is suboptimal in terms of satisfying his preferences. And, hence, the 
maximizing theory implies that each of the self-torturer’s options is impermissible. But that’s 
implausible. For it seems that any plausible solution to the puzzle of the self-torturer must 
admit that the self-torturer is permiRed to advance to some preferred stopping point and stop 
there.  
 So, not only is the compromise view intuitive in its own right, but, unlike its rivals, it is 
subject to none of F,–F|.  
 
D. Conclusion 
I’ve argued that no subject can be required to do something that she can intentionally do only 
by responding inappropriately to her reasons. This means that whether the self-torturer should 
advance from n to n+, depends on how the worlds that he could actualize by both responding 
appropriately to his reasons and advancing from n to n+, (call these the advancing-appropriately 
worlds) compare to the worlds that he could actualize by both responding appropriately to his 
reasons and refraining from advancing from n to n+, (call these the refraining-appropriately 
worlds). And I’ve argued that the best advancing-appropriately world will be beRer than every 
refraining-appropriately world except where he has resolved not to advance beyond n. This is 
for two reasons. First, wherever he has resolved not to advance beyond n, there will be no world 
that he could actualize by both responding appropriately to his reasons and advancing from n 
to n+,—that is, there will be no advancing-appropriately worlds. And, clearly, a refraining-
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appropriately world is beRer than no world at all. Second, wherever he hasn’t resolved not to 
advance beyond n, there will be some advancing-appropriately worlds that are beRer than any 
refraining-appropriately world. Thus, the self-torturer should not advance beyond any seRing 
that he has resolved not to go beyond but should advance to some preferred stopping point 
since doing so is both beRer than remaining forever at 0 and something that he can do without 
responding inappropriately to his reasons. Thus, I’ve argued that he should advance to some 
preferred stopping point and then remain there forever, forming, when necessary, the 
resolution not to advance beyond that preferred stopping point. And I’ve argued that this 
view—the compromise view—is superior to its rivals, which, as I’ve shown, all have one or 
more signiﬁcant ﬂaws.  
 The fact that no subject can be required to do what she can do intentionally only by 
responding inappropriately to her reasons is, I think, an important and often overlooked fact. 
As I’ve argued, here, it can help us solve a puzzle that otherwise seems intractable: the puzzle 
of the self-torturer. But, as I’ve argued elsewhere (Portmore Forthcoming, chap. u), it also helps 
us to solve other puzzles: e.g., how to best understand the common thought that a moral theory 
ought to be such that the agents who satisfy it, whoever and however numerous they may be, 
are guaranteed to produce the morally best world that they could (in the relevant sense) 
together produce.25 And, as I’ve argued elsewhere (Portmore /0,,, chap. /), it has important 
implications with respect to whether we should accept moral rationalism: the view that a 
subject can be morally obligated to do only what she has decisive reason to do, all things 
considered.26   
                                                        
25 Proponents of this thought include Baier ,-u1, Casteñeda ,-ks, Parﬁt ,-1s (p. -s), Pinkert /0,u, Regan 
,-10, and Zimmerman ,--|. 
26 For very helpful comments and discussions on earlier drafts, I thank Chrisoula Andreou, Richard YeRer 
Chappell, Sergio Tenenbaum, Travis Timmerman, and Stephen J. White. 
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